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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE H. CONN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 8927 
RICH WHITMORE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDE,NT 
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the record. 
The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in 
the court below.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor 
of defendant and against plaintiff. The action was based 
upon an alleged judgment obtained by plaintiff against 
defendant in Illinois. No personal service was made up-
on defendant in Illinois. He was served in Utah. Plain-
tiff sought to bring himself within paragraphs 16 and 17 
of ·Chapter 110, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1955. The trial 
court held the Illinois court had no jurisdiction over de-
fendant and the judgment was void and hence entered 
judgment for defendant. 
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Plaintiff in his brief makes no effort to make a state-
' ' ment of facts. The facts underlying the attempted asser-
tion of jurisdiction are material in the determination of 
this case. 
Plaintiff was a veterinarian and in the business of 
selling Arabian horses. His place of business was at 
Freeport, Illinois. Under date of February 1, 1955, he 
sent to plaintiff by mail (16) an offering of registered 
Arabian horses (Exhibit D-3). The two horses eventually 
purchased by defendant were there listed. So far as 
material here such offer provided: 
"Khiffr.aff * * * We are making very attrac-
tive price on this filly of $1,000.00. 
"* * * Khiffah * * * bay mare, 19 years old* * • 
we are going to price this mare at less than her 
1955 foal should be worth. The price is $750.00. '' 
(Exhibit D-3) 
Some time in April plaintiff wrote defendant in an 
attempt to sell him three horses. Then he wrote another 
letter stating that one of them was already sold and if 
defendant wanted the other two, he better make up his 
mind about it (15). Defendant recalled that he had a 
friend by the name of Dr. Wm. L. ~fonson who lived near 
plaintiff. He called Dr. Monson on the telephone and 
asked him to check the quality of plaintiff's horses. He 
reported favorably (13, 15, 16). Defendant mailed a letter 
from Salt Lake City accepting the offer and enclosing a 
checkfor $1,000.00, part payment for the tw-o horses (18). 
Defendant then sent Mr. Carpenter, his en1ployee, to 
Freeport, Illinois, to pick up the horses (13, 14). He took 
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3 
with him a check for $750.00 which he delivered to plain-
tiff at the time he picked up the horses ( 14). 
These are the basic facts upon which the trial court 
rendered judgment for defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ILLINOIS JUDGMENT HEREIN SUED UPON IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT UNDER 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE SAID 
JUDGMENT IS VOID 'FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
POINT II 
THE ILLINOIS STATUTE RELIED UPON BY PLAIN-
TIFF TO VALIDATE HIS JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPLI-
CABLE BE1CAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TRANSACT ANY 
BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THAT STATUTE. 
POINT III 
IF THE ILLINOIS STATUTE WERE HELD APPLI-
CABLE TO 1THIS CASE THEN SUCH CONS'TRUCTIO:r{ 
WOULD VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS .CLAUSE OF THE 




'THE ILLINOIS JUDGMENT HEREIN SUED UPON IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT UNDER 
THE UNITED STATES 'CONSTITUTION BECAUSE SAID 
JUDGMENT IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
It is thoroughly settled that the United States Con-
stitutional provision (Article IV, Section 1), that full 
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4 
faith and credit shall be given in each State to the judi-
cial proceedings in other States does not preclude inquiry 
into the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment 
is rendered or into the facts necessary to give such juris-
diction. 
It is also thoroughly settled that if the court did not 
have jurisdiction then any judgment rendered by it is void 
and would not come within the protection of the full faith 
and credit clause of the Constitution and other States 
would not need to enforce any of the terms or provisions 
of such judgment. 
The following cases support the foregoing proposi-
tions: Williams v. N orlh Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.C. 
1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577; MiUiken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 
S.C. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278; Wampler v. Wampler, 25 Wash. 
2d 2'58, 170 p .2d 316. 
Defendant here asserts lack of jurisdiction based on 
two propositions. Only through the provisions of Sec-
tions 16 and 17, Chapter 110 of the Revised Statutes of 
Illinois, 1955, could plaintiff obtain jurisdiction over de-
fendant. The purchase by defendant of the two horses 
under the situation presented here could not bring this 
case within the provisions of that statute and hence the 
jurisdiction of the Illinois court fails upon that ground. 
The other proposition contended for by defendant only 
need be considered in the event defendant is not correct 
upon his first proposition. If this s~tute is made appli-
cable to the factual situation presented in the case at bar, 
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5 
then such application violates the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Upon either of these grounds the Illinois court would 
lack jurisdiction and its judgment would be void. 
POINT II 
THE ILLINOIS STATUTE RELIED UPON BY PLAIN-
TIFF TO VALIDATE HIS JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPLI-
CABLE BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TRANSACT ANY 
BUSINESS WITHIN 'THE STATE OF ILLINOIS WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THAT STATUTE. 
Section 17, Chapter 110 Illinois Revised Statutes, 
1955, so far as material here, provides : 
"(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this State, who in person or through 
an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumer-
ated, thereby submits said person, and, if an in-
dividual, his personal representative, to the juris-
diction of the courts of this State as to any cause 
of action arising from the doing of any of said 
acts: 
" (a) The transaction of any business within 
this State; 
"(b) The commission of a tortious act within 
this State; 
" (c) The ownership, use, or possession of 
any real estate situated in this State; 
" (d) Contracting to insure any person, prop-
erty, or risk located within this State 
at the time of contracting. 
* * * 
"(3) Only causes of action arising from acts 
enumerated· herein may be asserted against a de-
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6 
f endant in an action in which jurisdiction over him 
is based upon this section." 
It is the contention of plaintiff that this case falls 
within subdivision (a) of the foregoing statute. It should 
be observed that this was not the transaction of any busi-
ness of the defendant. Plaintiff was the one that was in 
the business of selling horses. 
Defendant had no office nor place of business in the 
State of Illinois, he merely accepted an offer by plaintiff 
to sell horses. 
The acceptance of the offer occurred when defendant 
mailed the acceptance and $1,000.00 payment. For this 
reason the contract herein involved was not even made in 
Illinois. It was a contract entered into at the time the 
acceptance was mailed in Utah. 1 Williston on Contracts, 
Third Edition, Section 81. 
Defendant picked up the horses through his agent. 
We submit that it was never contemplated by the enact-
ment of this statute that this type of transaction would 
subject a buyer to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. 
If this is applicable, then persons buying by catalogue 
from mail order houses would be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts where the order is filled. The fact that 
an agent was sent to pick up the horses is only incidental 
and would not materially distinguish this case from a mail 
order case. Cases have construed this Illinois statute 
and indicate that the statute is not applicable here. 
In Grobark v . .Addo Machine Comp(J;ny, 18 Ill. App. 
2d 10, 151 N.E. 2d 425 (1958), an action was commenced 
to recover damages for interference with contract rights. 
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A summons was served under the foregoing statute. A 
motion to quash the service was granted and on appeal 
affirmed. Plaintiff sold adding machines which it pur-
chased from defendant. Defendant was a New York cor-
poration not licensed to do business in Illinois and with 
its headquarters in New York. In 1953 defendant sent a 
letter to plaintiff appointing him exclusive distributor 
in the greater part of Illinois. Thereafter defendant ad-
vised plaintiff that the distributorship would be cancelled. 
In concluding that the defendant was not transacting any 
business within the meaning of this statute, the court 
pointed out that it maintained no offices in Illinois nor 
did it 'employ anyone there. We submit that this case is 
analogous to the present case and shows that there must 
be more of a contact with the State of Illinois than exists 
here in order to subject a person to the jurisdiction of its 
courts. 
In Orton v. Woods Ovl & G.as Company, 249 F. 2d 
198, the court held the situation presented did not bring 
defendant within the Illinois statute and that hence the 
motion to quash the service of summons was properly 
granted. One plaintiff w.as a business engineering con-
sultant and the other a lawyer. They performed the 
necessary work in Illinois to get defendant company or-
ganized and doing business. This work was performed 
in Chicago. The summons was served on defendant in 
Louisiana. In holding that the statute was not applicable, 
the court stated: 
"We shall not engage in a further definition 
of 'the transaction of any business within this 
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State.' It is sufficient here to hold that th~ ~er­
formance of the professional services ~y pla~tiffs 
for the benefit of defendant as herem outlined, 
standing alone, are insufficient to ~ring defend-
ant within any reasonable construction of the Act 
in question. To rule otherwise would be to stretch 
the doctrine of the International Shoe case to the 
breaking point, and to expand t~e illinois concept 
of state jurisdiction over nonresidents beyond the 
limit imposed by due process." 
Plaintiff cites the case of Nelson v. Miller, 11 ill. 2d 
378, 143 N.E. 2d 673, as in point here. That case came 
within the provisions of subdivision (b) providing that 
if a person committed a tortious act in illinois that person 
would be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Illinois 
courts. It has nothing to do with whether or not business 
was transacted within illinois. The wording of subdivi-
sion (a) and (b) points up the distinction which should be 
made. Subdivision (a) does not provide that if a person 
enters into a contract with an individual in Illinois such 
person shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 
It uses language long familiar to courts, to-wit: the trans-
action of any business. If the Legislature intended to 
cover the present situation it could have worded the 
statute so that it would include a situation w·here "a con-
tract was made in Illinois." Subdivision (d) further con-
firms this contention. Under that subdivision if a person 
contracts to insure any person located within lllinois such 
person shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. 
I-Iere is a specific provision relating to a contract of in-
surance. If the Legislature had intended that all persons 
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who contracted in illinois or with Illinois residents were 
subject to its courts this provision would be unnecessary 
because such a contract of necessity would be included 
within the provisions of subdivision (a). The use of spe-
cific language in subdivision (b) and (d) indicates that 
the general language in (a) has a broader application 
than to include one transaction of contract. 
In Rensing v. Turner Aviation Co., 166 F. Sup. 790, 
this latter distinction is suggested. The case involved a 
situation under subdivision (b), but the court, in con-
sidering this problem, stated: 
"Whether this court would also have jurisdic-
tion over the person of the defendant by virtue of 
Section 17 (1) (a) is questionable since the Act 
by its express terms states that the cause of action 
must arise from the 'the transaction of any busi-
ness within this State.' Further, in light of Orton 
v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., it might be difficult to 
maintain that the defendant's occasional, sporadic 
and irregular flights into illinois amounted to such 
'minimum contacts' with the territory of the forum 
so that the maintenance of a suit in personam 
would not 'offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.' To do so might expand 
the Illinois concept of State jurisdiction over non-
residents beyond the limit imposed by due 
process." 
In that case the defendant chartered airplane flights 
into Illinois and on one of which plaintiff was injured. 
The use of the words "any business" in the statute 
does not mean a single act would bring the person within 
the statute. In Worcester Felt Pad Corp. v. Tucson A~r-
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port Authority, 233 F. 2d 44, in construing the words 
"any business" it was held that it meant more than a 
single act. The court stated: 
"The words 'any business, enterprise, or oc-
cupation' do not refer to single act, but instead 
to a plurality of acts." 
The statute does not say "any contract'' or "any act," 
it uses the word "business" and the use of that word 
certainly contemplates that the individual must be in some 
type of business which he is transacting. It should not 
concern isolated purchases by a person not in any busi-
ness connected with the sale. 
The Utah cases clearly indicate that the type of trans-
action here involved is not the transacting of any business 
within the State of Illinois. Our Utah statutes use the 
words "doing any business" (Section 16-8-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953) and interchange "doing" and "trans-
acting'' (Sections 16-8-2, 3). 
In Western G.a;s AppliJances, Inc. v. Servel, Inc., 123 
Ut. 2'29, 257 P.2d 950, dismissal of the case for lack of 
jurisdiction was affirmed. Plaintiff, for several years, 
had been a distributor of defendant's gas and electric 
home appliances. Defendant, a Delaware corporation, 
had its principal place of business in Indiana. Defendant 
terminated this contract with plaintiff and appointed an-
other distributor. The law suit arose out of this termina-
tion. Service of summons 'vas made upon the service 
manager of defendant who was temporarily within the 
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State. The attitude of our court on this subject was ex-
pressed as follows: 
"No authority has been cited which could sup-
port a conclusion, that the activities of defendant 
herein above enumerated, are sufficient to render 
a foreign corporation amenable to process. It is 
indisputable that the mere presence here of an 
officer of a foreign corporation will not subject it 
to suit, nor will the sale of goods at a foreign 
factory to an independent distributor located 
within this state; neither is the aiding of the 
distributor in his duties of promoting sales and 
servicing activities of independent dealers (retail-
ers) through instructing or training them and 
their employees; nor the giving of a warranty and 
the shipping to an independent dealer the parts 
and units to meet its terms. 
"It is also well settled that an isolated trans-
action such as the installation of the one air-con-
ditioning unit and heating system would not create 
the status of doing business here. As the court 
said in Dahl v. Collette: 
"'* * * if * * * (the corporation's presence) is 
manifested only by casual, sporadic, or isolated 
exertions of the kind which it ordinarily performs, 
these indicia of its presence are too equivocal and 
uncertain to support the inference that it is doing 
business here.' 
"Thus before defendant's acts could properly 
be classified as doing business within the State, 
it would have to be shown that there was some 
degree of continuity or regularity of such acts, 
coupled with some manner of entering into direct 
business transactions with others. If such circum-
stances did exist, the acts of defendant herein 
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shown might properly be considered in augmenta-
tion of other proof as to doing business. . 
"We are appreciative of the fact ~~at the 
policy underlying decisions_ of t~e court ~ cases 
such as this requires consideration of fru.r play 
to citizens desiring to seek redress in court for 
claimed injuries, as well as to the fact that foreign 
corporations who do business here should not be 
afforded any unfair advantage against local com-
peting companies who pay taxes and licenses for 
doing business here and are subject to the juris-
diction of our courts. 
"But jurisdiction of citizens of other states 
may not be arbitrarily conferred by the law, nor 
assumed by the courts, of sister states. Under the 
federal constitution as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court, the authority of state 
courts over foreign corporations is limited to cir-
cumstances where they do 'business in the state 
* * * in such a manner and to such an extent that 
its actual presence there is established.' 
"In this context, as noted in International 
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, the term 'pres-
ence' is 
" 'used merely to symbolize those activities of 
the corportion's agent within the state which 
courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the de-
Inands of due process.' " 
See also McGr~ff 'l'. Charles Antell, Inc., 123 lTt. 166, 
256 P.2d 703; .Alw.ard ·r. Green, 122 Ut. 35, 245 P.2d 855; 
Dykes v. ReliJable F·zwni·ture & Carpet, 3 lTt. 2d 34, 277 
P.2d 969, East Coast D~count Gorp. v. Reynolds, 4 Ut. 
2d 362, 325 P.2d 853; Prndent·£al Federal Sa.t'ings & Loan 
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Assoc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Ut. 2d 
366, 325 P.2d 899. 
The foregoing cases also stand for the proposition 
that a single transaction does not make a person amenable 
to the courts of the state wherein the transaction vvas 
had. Illinois has also ruled in accordance with these cases. 
Fimch & Company v. Zenith Furnace Company, 245 Ill. 
586, 92 N.E. 521. 
In view of the fact that the contract for the purchase 
of the horses in the case at bar was entered into in Utah 
the following quotation from Alward v. Green, supra, is 
particularly applicable. 
"The fundamental difficulty with the plain-
tiff's contention in this case, under our rules, is 
that his cause of action did not arise out of any 
business transacted by him with the defendant in 
the State of Utah. His contract was made with the 
defendant in the State of California and is subject 
to the laws and rules and regulations of the State 
of California, and his cause of action is based upon 
a breach of his contract entered into with the de-
fendant in the State of California." 
Defendant, in his brief at Page 10, cites cases to the 
effect that statutes similar to that in Illinois have been 
upheld. These cases are not in point and the very lan-
guage of the statutes involved in those cases indicate the 
inapplicability of the Illinois statute to the situation in 
the case at bar. 
In Smythe v. Twiln St.ate Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 
569, 80 A.2d 664, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1193, a Vermont statute 
provided that if a foreign corporation makes a contract 
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14 
with a resident of Vermont to be performed in whole or 
in part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont, such 
act shall be deemed doing business and the corporation 
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of V er-
mont. In the first place this case sounded in tort and the 
statute specifically applied to the commission of a tort 
in Vermont. If a contract were involved the statute there 
would specifically cover the situation. The Illinois statute 
does not refer to a contract, but only relates to the trans-
action of any business. 
In Jones v. Bay State Abrasive Products Company, 
89 F. Sup. 654 and Compawie De.Astral v. Boston Metals 
Company, 205 l\1:d. 338, 107 A.2d 357, a Maryland statute 
was involved. That statute provided that every foreign 
corporation should be subject to suit in Maryland on any 
cause of action arising out of a contract made within 
Maryland whether or not such foreign corporation was 
doing business or had done business in the state. Here 
again, the statute specifically applies to a contract and 
not to the transaction of business. This alone distin-
guishes the cases involving the Maryland statute. 
None of the above authorities cited by defendant 
would be applicable here because the contract was made 
in Utah not in Illinois. Here we have the startling con-
tention that an Illinois court has jurisdiction over a resi-
dent in Utah who has made a contract in Utah with an 
Illinois resident. Under this principal llOY\'" could it be 
asserted that it is either fair or dispensing substantial 
justice to subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts a 
Utah resident· who happens to buy a couple of horses 
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from an Illinois resident. No case of which we are aware 
has gone this far in holding that a judgment rendered 
under such conditions would constitute due process of law. 
The most recent case by the United States Supreme 
Court, McGee v. InternatiJonal LiJfe Insurance Company, 
355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957), does 
not go so far. In that case a California statute (similar 
to section 17 (1) (d) of the Illinois statute, supra) sub-
jected insurance companies to the jurisdiction of Cali-
fornia courts on insurance contracts with residents of 
that state even though the company could not be served 
in California. 
No such situation exists in the case at bar. The de-
fendant there was in the insurance business and the ob-
taining of a policy holder in California and the receipt 
of premiums was the transaction of its business in Cali-
fornia. Such situation is a far cry from one where a Utah 
resident buys two horses from an Illinois resident and 
certainly is not the transaction of any of the Utah resi-
dent's business in Illinois. 
We submit that under the foregoing .authorities the 
purchase of these horses by defendant should not bring 
him within the terms of this Illinois statute thereby sub-
jecting him to the jurisdiction of that court and render 
him liable upon a judgment made under such circum-
stances. 
POINT III 
IF THE ILLINOIS STATUTE WERE HELD APPLI-
CABLE TO 1THIS CASE THEN SUCH CONSTRUCTION 
WOULD VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
As indicated under Point II, it is our belief that the 
situation presented in the case at bar is not one which 
would come within the terms and provisions of the Illinois 
statute. However, if it does then it is a violation of the 
concept of due process of law as embodied in the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 25 L. Ed. 565, was for 
many years the leading case on this question of juris-
diction and the enforcement of judgments in sister states. 
However, now the principles to be applied have now been 
established by the case of Internat~onal Shoe Company v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. ·Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 
A.L.R. 1057 (1945). That case was a proceeding by the 
State of Washington to collect unpaid contributions to 
the unemployment compensation fund. Process was 
served in Washington on a sales solicitor employed by 
defendant company. Defendant's motion to set aside the 
order was denied and defendant was held subject to the 
jurisdiction of the W ashingtou courts. Defendant was a 
Delaware corporation having its principal place of busi-
ness in Missouri. It was engaged in the manufacture and 
sale of shoes. Defendant had no office in Washington, 
made no contracts either for the sale or the purchase 
of merchandise there, maintained no stock of merchandise 
and made no delivery of goods in intrastate connnerce. 
During the years in question defendant had employed 11 
to 13 salesmen under direct supervision and control of 
sales managers located in St. Louis. These sales1nen re-
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sided in Washington. Their principal activities were con-
fined to that state and they were compensated by com-
missions based upon the amount of sales. Defendant sup-
plied these salesmen with a line of samples. On occasions 
they rented sample rooms in business buildings or hotels, 
for which defendant reimbursed them. The salesmen 
transmitted their orders to defendant in Missouri, which 
orders were subject to its approval. The court held that 
defendant was subject to Washington judicial jurisdic-
tion. The court stated: 
"Historically the jurisdiction of courts to ren-
der judgment in personam is grounded on their 
de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence 
his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of 
a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judg-
ment personally binding him. Penn oyer v. Neff, 
95 U.S. 714, 733, 24 L. Ed. 565. But now that the 
capias ad respondendum has given way to personal 
service of summons or other form of notice, due 
process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradition-
al notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " 
"Those demands may be met by such contacts 
of the corporation with the state of the forum as 
make it reasonable·, in the context of our federal 
system of government, to require the corporation 
to defend the particular suit which is brought 
there. An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which 
would result to the corporation from a trial away 
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from its 'home' or principal place of business is 
relevant in this connection." 
* 
"Conversely it has been generally recognized 
that the casual presence of the corporate agent or 
even his conduct of single or isolated items of 
activities in a state in the corporation's behalf 
are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of 
action unconnected with the activities there. St. 
Clair v. Cox, supra, 106 U.S. 359, 360, 1 S. Ct. 362, 
363, 27 L. Ed. 222; Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. 
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21, 27 S. Ct. 236, 240, 51 
L. Ed. 345; Frene v. Louisville Cement ·Co., supra, 
77 U.S. App. D.C. 133, 134 F.2d 515, 146 A.L.R. 
926, and cases cited. To require the corporation 
in such circumstances to defend the suit away from 
its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on 
more substantial activities has been thought to lay 
too great and unreasonable burden on the corpora-
tion to comport with due process.'' 
Tested by the principles there laid dov."'TI, to make 
the Illinois statute applicable to the situation at bar 
would deny to defendant due process of law. It is to be 
noted that the minimum contacts with the state must be 
such that the maintainance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
Certainly to hold this defendant subject to Illinois juris-
diction would offend in the manner indicated. No case 
with such minimal contacts as here has been cited to up-
hold plaintiff's position. 
This case expressly recognizes the rule that single or 
isolated activities are not enough to subject even a cor-
poration, let alone an individual, to state jurisdiction. To 
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require this Utah resident to defend the action in Illinois 
under these facts would place too great and unreasonable 
a burden upon him "to comport with due process of law." 
We submit that to give this statute the construction 
contended for by plaintiff would make it violative of the 
due process clause of the XIVth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and hence void and not entitled to full 
faith and credit. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the judgment here sued 
upon does not come within the protection of the full faith 
and credit clause of the United States Constitution. The 
defendant's act of making a contract for the purchase of 
two horses from a resident of Chicago and then picking 
up the horses through an agent does not constitute the 
transaction of any business within Illinois within the Illi-
nois statute. If this statute were so construed it would 
violate the due proces's clause of the United States Con-
stitution and would hence be unconstitutional and a judg-
ment based thereon would be void. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK 
Counsel for Resp,ondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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